摘要
Evolutionarygamedynamicsinfinitesizepopulationscanbedescribedbyafitness-dependentWrightFisherprocess.Weconsidersymmetric2x2gamesinawell-mixedpopulation.Inourmodel,twoparameterstodescribethelevelofplayer’srationalityandnoiseintensityinenvironmentareintroduced.Incontrastwiththefixationprobabilitymethodthatusedinanoiselesscase,theintroducingofthenoiseintensityparametermakestheprocessanergodicMarkovprocessandbasedonthelimitdistributionoftheprocess,wecananalysistheevolutionarystablestrategy(ESS)ofthegames.WeillustratetheeffectsofthetwoparametersontheESSofgamesusingthePrisoner’sdilemmagames(PDG)andthesnowdriftgames(SG).WealsocomparetheESSofourmodelwiththatofthereplicatordynamicsininfinitesizepopulations.Theresultsaredeterminedbysimulationexperiments.
出版日期
2011年09月19日(中国期刊网平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)