摘要
Chauffeuredcarservice(CCS)hasdevelopedrapidlyinrecentyears.AlthoughCCSbringsconvenienceandeffectiveness,italsotriggerssomenewproblemslikeviciouscompetition.ThisworkstudiestheduopolycompetitionbetweenCCScompanyandtaxicompany,intermsofdifferentaveragecostandnumberofvehiclesoftwocompanies.Tofindthesolutionslikethepricingschemetoeasetheviciouscompetition,Hotellingmodelisintroduced.TheHotelling-typemodelisusedtopresentpassengers’preferencestothecompanies.Besides,failingsituationistakenintoaccountintheHotellingmodeltodescribethesituationwherepassenger’sdemandisnotsatisfiedinreality.Thisworktheoreticallyanalyzesthepriceschemeandequilibriummarketsegmentationbasedontheaveragecostandnumberofvehiclesofeachcompany.Furthermore,companies’profits,passengers’utilityandsocialwelfareinequilibriumarerevealedbasedonthegametheory.Thestudyshowsthatbothofcompaniescangetoptimalprofitsbysettingeffectivepricescheme.Thecompanywhichhashigherprice,definitelygetslessmarketshare.Inaddition,moderatecompetitioncanleadtopositiveinfluenceonsocialwelfare.
出版日期
2017年06月16日（中国期刊网平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）
