摘要
Threegenericformsofgovernance--hierarchy,hybridandmarketareproposedinthenewinstitutionaleconomics,givinganabstractdescriptionofalternativecoordinationandcontrolmechanismsforgeneraluse.Whilethistheoryisknownasfarawayfrombeingoperationalandspecified,afewresearchersinthemanagementandorganizationareaaretryingtoextendGalbraithand/orMintzberg'sorganizationaldesigntheoriesintotheapplicationoflogisticalcoordinationforobtainingasmoothflowofproductsalongthesupplychainwithinandwithoutthefocalorganization.Inthispaper,wepresentanexplorativecasestudyonthedesignofvariousorganizationalarchitecturesoflogisticsactivitiesandtheirrelevantcoordinationmechanisms,especiallyinternalandexternalcontractsasonenewkindofhybridmechanismsforcoordinatingeffectivesupplychains.
出版日期
2001年01月11日(中国期刊网平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)