简介：Giventheexistenceoftransactioncosts,thelocationofpropertyrightsisanimportantfactorindeterminingtheincentivesforefficientlevelsofinvestmentatvariouslevelsoftheindustry.Thispaperappliessomeoftheeconomictheoriesofpropertyrightsandindustrialstructuretotheissuesconcerningtheconservationofbiodiversity.AlthoughtheexpansionofIntellectualPropertyRights(IPR)systemsintotheareaofgeneticresourceshasincreasedprivateinvestmentinR&Dprocessoftheagriculture,itdoesnotgenerateenoughincentivesforinsituconservationofbiodiversity.Tosolvethiseconomicinefficiency,farmers’rightsandotherdesignofincentivesandinstitutionalarrangementshouldbereconsidered.

简介：InChina,farmlandpropertyrightscharacterizedbythehousehold-responsibilitysystem(HRS)havebeenimprovedsincethereformandopening-up.Therightsofuse,transferandgainbecomemorestable,authorizedandcomplete.Thispaperfirstlyanalyzestheimpactonfarmlandproductivity,whichcomesfromtheimprovementoffarmlandpropertyrights.Then,aneconomet-ricmodelisbuilttotesttheaboveanalysis.ItconcludesthatchangesofpropertyrightswillaffectfarmlandperformanceinChina.Intheend,somepolicyimplicationsareexploredforfur-therreforms.